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HIJACKING OF TITLE VII EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION PLAINTIFFS ON THE WAY TO
THE JURY
Steven R. Semler*
I. INTRODUCTION

The object of Title VII, since its enactment in 1964, is to eradicate
intentional invidious discrimination in employment on the basis of race,
sex, national origin, or religion.' Yet, court decisions over the half
century since Title VII's enactment have made the task of a Title VII
disparate treatment plaintiff who lacks direct evidence of discrimination
to get to the jury increasingly difficult by a brew of: (i) restrictive
pleading, (ii) substantive law requirements and interpretations, and (iii)
evidentiary devices-which collectively serve to convert the central
statutory inquiry of intent to, instead, legal issues. The net effect is to
shift focus away from jury determination of the fact of discriminatory
motivation to, instead, artfully become transformed by the courts into
mechanisms which can be manipulated by the employer for court
determination upon dispositive motion. Employers artfully have turned
use of these mechanisms into bullet-proof dispositive legal inquiries to
*

Adjunct Faculty, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America, Washington,

DC.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 provides in relevant part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race. .. ." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The
statutory standard for proving such intentional discrimination is found at 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(m):
"an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
It is well settled that the prohibition bans all intentional discrimination on the protected bases. See,
e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Indeed,
employment practices which are discriminatory in impact though neutral in intent are prohibited as
well: "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms
of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971).
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be determined by judges on motion in lieu of trial by jury. The net result
effectively functions to keep the factual motivation issues from ever
getting to the jury and instead to become determined on the basis of
legal issues strategically crafted by the employer to assure the absence of
a jury question and, correspondingly, the employer's success on
dispositive motion. The courts facilitate this-perhaps as docket control
devices-and employers take full advantage of such opportunity to
attempt to structure the case to avoid having the claim decided by the
vagaries of a jury-much less a potential "runaway jury."
There are multiple tiers of such analytical frameworks and devices
which operate cumulatively to achieve this conversion from fact issue to
legal issue. First, the threshold of pleading adequacy required to survive
motions to dismiss has been raised by the courts; thus potentially
precluding the plaintiff from ever getting to discovery to support her
claim, and disposing of the case ab initio. Second, the standards
applicable to adjudicating summary judgment motions also have become
more permissive. Third, the substantive law increasingly has been
interpreted by the courts to convert the central jury-determinationfact
inquiry of discriminatory intent, to the wholly different courtmanufactured and court-determined legal inquiry of whether a pretext
case exists-whether plaintiff has mounted a jury-triable issue as to the
legitimacy or falsity of the employer's asserted business reason for its
challenged employment action-as to which the employer has no burden
to prove but as to which the plaintiff has the burden to disprove. Fourth,
facilitating this conversion from an issue of fact for the jury to
dispositive legal issue for the court, is the increasing assortment of
judicially created "evidentiary toolbox" 2 devices which serve to
neutralize fact-evidence of discrimination or pretext (by deeming
potentially key pieces of evidence of intent to be not genuine, material,
or probative). This combination facilitates dismissal of the claim upon
dispositive motion and, perhaps coincidentally, thereby allowing the
courts to prune their dockets of employment discrimination cases.
Collectively, this brew of employer strategic selection of reason for
its action as to which it has no burden of proof, upon which it can then
force the plaintiff into a burden of disproving on the basis of evidence
that the employer has set the trap of the plaintiffs inability to disprove,
and to further marginalize evidence of discrimination by judicial

2. A term of my invention, referring to the grab bag of judicially created devices which can
be used by employers to judicially neuter-individually or collectively-pieces of evidence from
supporting a jury question of discriminatory intent. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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creation of increasing court-crafted "legal tools" to neuter issues of fact
for the jury. These "legal tools" all serve to hijack the plaintiffs jury
determination of discrimination to a different question of law to be
determined by a judge on dispositive motion.
The cumulative effect of these mechanisms has been devastating to
plaintiffs seeking to get their Title VII employment discrimination
claims to juries, and correspondingly rewarding to employers skilled in
aggressively exploiting-perhaps "out-lawyering" adversaries less
skilled in navigating these tricky waters-by structuring strategic
deployment of'these mechanisms to prevent employment discrimination
claims from reaching juries. More employment discrimination claims
filed in federal courts are disposed of upon dispositive pretrial motion
than any other type of claim, 3 hence never reaching a jury. Of those that
*4survive dispositive
motions, most settle. Inviting aggressive utilization
of these devices and doctrines is the key battleground for stopping such
cases from having to be settled, much less from ever being exposed to
the risk of jury determination.
The reasons for each are described below and then a potential
solution to facilitate allowing the statutory inquiry to be reset to where
Congress intended from the outset.
II. ROUND ONE: RAISING THRESHOLD FOR PLEADING UNDER FRCP
RULE 8(A)(2) AND, CORRESPONDINGLY, FOR MTD's UNDER RULE
12(B)(6)
The pleading requirements of complaints filed in the Federal Courts
are defined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") Rule
8(a)(2), which merely requires the complaint to set forth "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief. . . ."s The Rule has not changed.6

Instead, the Supreme Court

3. See Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael
Baylson
15 tbl.
10 (Aug.
13, 2008) (on file with author), available at
https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/sujulrs2.pdf (showing that in a sample of cases where a
party moves for summary judgment, 16% of employment discrimination cases were disposed of by
a summary judgment granted in whole, while the average of all cases in the study was 6%). This,
does not address the cases already filtered out earlier on motions to dismiss. See Part I.D, infra.
4. See Robert Nelson et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?
Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post-Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 175, 187 fig. I (2010) (analyzing a study of employment discrimination cases that
were settled in federal court from 1988-2003).
5. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
6. See id.
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moved the Rule's goal posts.
A. The GoalPost
Thus, for many years, the lenient "no set of facts" standard of
Conley v. Gibson7 applied: Rule 8 requiring nothing more than that "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 8 Relying on
Rule 8, the Court concluded that all that the Rule required was that
defendant receive "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests," thus allowing merely "notice pleading,"
after which the details of the claim could be fleshed out by the "liberal
opportunity for discovery," 9 noting the Federal Rules "reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill . . . ."'o McCray v. Standard

Oil Co. (Indiana)," sustained the complaint under Rule 8 with
conclusory unspecified class allegations of discrimination by, inter alia,
"[m]aintaining job classifications segregated on the basis of race, color
and sex .. ." The Court noted that Conley did not require more and,
rather, that such notice served the purpose of allowing the defendant to
take discovery to ascertain specifically what the plaintiff was suing
about, stating1 2: "The pleadings are not designed to carry the burden of
formulating the issues and advising the adverse party of the facts
involved.
Depositions and discovery procedures perform that
3
function."1
B. The Goal Post Moved
As noted, Rule 8(a)(2) was not changed, but its requirements as to
the minimum required standards of pleading were effectively,
substantively tightened by a pair of Supreme Court cases-first in 2007
by an antitrust case (Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly)1 4 the holding of
7. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41(1957). This case arose on an employment discrimination
claim brought by African-American employees alleging their jobs were discriminatorily replaced by
Caucasians. Id. at 42-43.
8. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 47.
10. Id at 48.
11. McCrary v. Standard Oil Co. (id.), 76 F.R.D. 490 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
12. Id. at 496.
13. Id.
14. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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which was extended to civil rights claims in 2009 (Ashcroft v. Iqbal).
The goal posts imposed by the Rule were moved further from the
plaintiff.
In Twombly, the Supreme Court held an antitrust complaint was
insufficient to state a claim under Rule 8(a)(2) and was required to be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court concluded that the "formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action,"'1 6 the legal "conclusion[s]
couched as a factual allegation," 7 and the "naked assertion[s] devoid of
'further factual enhancement,"" 8 would not be sufficient pleadings
under Rule 8(a)(2). Rather, the Court crafted a tenuous tightrope of a
higher standard that more facts need to be alleged to be sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss ("MTD") a complaint must allege enough
facts which make the appearance of a violation "plausibleon its face."
The facts must allege something that is more than a possibility though
less than a "probabilityrequirementat the pleading stage; it simply calls
for enough fact [in the complaint] to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement." 2 0 Under this
gossamer formulation, mere possibility of a violation was deemed
insufficient pleading: but plausibility of a violation being pled became
the new required minimum.21

Pleading facts which are merely

consistent with liability "stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief'" under Rule 8(a)(2). 22 The Court
additionally stated in Iqbal that "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice."2 3
While the Court claimed merely to be interpreting the existing
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), it does not require intensive analysis to
appreciate that having to plead "plausible probability" of a violation
imposes a far higher pleading bar than the Conley standard of failing to
plead "no set of facts" that might support a violation.24 Indeed, while
Conley was based on minimizing the burden on the plaintiff to get to

15. See Aschcroft v. lqbal 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
16. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
17. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
18. Id.
19. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
21. See id at 556, 570.
22. Id. at 557 (quoting DM Research, Inc. v. Coll of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56 (1st
Cir. 1999)).
23. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
24. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
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discovery to establish facts in support of her claim ("liberal opportunity
for discovery" suffices to ferret out facts in support of a claim),25
Twombly rested on precisely the reverse -a desire to protect defendants
from the cost and imposition of expensive discovery ("antitrust
discovery can be expensive"). 26 But ultimately, discussed in Round
Two, the change was more due to an evolving pattern of creating
multiple devices to prune and protect judicial dockets than out of
concern with discovery burdens on litigants.27
Twombly was extended two years later into the constitutional
(rather than statutory) civil rights litigation realm by Iqbal, which held
the complaint insufficient to pass the "plausible claim" pleading
threshold imposed by Twombly. 28 Iqbal contended that he was detained
by the government due to his national origin and related invidious
characteristics. 2 9 The Court, sustaining dismissal of his claim, held that
while it was factually conceivable under the factual allegations of the
complaint, nonetheless, the complaint's facts did not show that the
discrimination allegations were plausible.30 Returning to the Twombly
theme of protecting defendants from discovery, the Court explained in
Iqbal that "Rule .8 ... does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions."3 1 But, keeping the
now-required "plausibility" determination opaque, the court explained
that this invites a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." 32 While
conclusions are insufficient, if added with facts assumed to be true as
pled, the court is to determine if the insufficient line of possibility of
violation is passed and if the required higher pleading standard of
plausibility is met. 3 But legal conclusions pled as facts are not entitled
to the presumption of truth under this formulation.34 Applying these
principles, the Court in Iqbal found that the facts of discriminatory intent
alleged were conclusory and insufficient to nudge the complaint "across
the line from conceivable to plausible."
At bottom, a "plausible

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See id. at 47-48.
See Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-59 (2007).
See infra Parts III.B., III.C.
See Igbal, 556 U.S. at 683.
Id. at 666, 668-69.
Id. at 680.
See id at 678-79.
See id at 679.
See id.
See id
Id. at 680 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)).
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complaint" must at least "plead[] factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference" of the existence of a violation.36
Suffice it to say the plausible pleading requirement has significantly
tightened the judicial filter on allowing Title VII cases to go forward as a
matter of law, as compared to the Conley "notice-pleading" standard.
C. Swierkiewicz
Enigmatically hanging tenuously between the loose pleading
standard of Conley 38 and the heightened pleading standard of Twombly
and Iqbal, is the Supreme Court's holding in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema39 _
a Title VII case which relied on Conley40 and was noted but not
overruled in Twombly. 41 The case held that the complaint was not
required to plead a prima facie case under the rubric of McDonnell
Douglas and that a "heightened pleading standard" was not applicable to
Title VII cases-doing so without reaching whether its factual
averments were plausible under the Twombly/Iqbal standard or
reviewing how the plausible-pleading standard was not a "heightened
pleading standard." 4 2 Much scholarly content has been devoted to
whether Swierkiewicz can survive Twombly and Iqbal 3 -stated
otherwise, whether a complaint can meet the plausibility requirement

36. Id. at 678.
37. See, e.g., Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 191 (4t' Cir. 2010) (holding
claim of race discrimination not plausibly pled because allegations were conclusory and did not
frame an inference of discrimination); See also Henry v. NYC Health & Hosp. Corp., No. 13 Civ.
6909, 2014 WL 957074, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2014) ("Here, the Amended Complaint lacks any
factual basis from which one could infer that any Caucasian employee similarly situated to Henry
was subject to differential treatment."); Dudek v. Greektown Casino, LLC, Civil Case Case No. 13cv-12471,-2013 WL 6823282, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2013). But see Ocholi v. SkyWest
Airlines, No. 11-C-0310, 2012 WL 3150310, at *1, *9-10 (E.D. Wis. July 31, 2012) ("Upholding
plausibility, after disregarding conclusory statements, because the facts alleged "contains a
straightforward claim and presents a story that holds together by identifying who discriminated
against him, the type of discrimination, and when it took place." (emphasis added)).
38. See supra Part II.A.
39. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibility
Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1613, 1649 (2011); Arthur S.
Leonard, Trial by Jury or Trial by Motion? Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and Employment

Discrimination,57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 659, 660 (2012/2013).
40. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509, 512, 514.
41. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); Sullivan, supra note
39, at 1618.
42.
See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508, 510-15. Swierkiewicz did not use the Iqbal and
Twombly standard because the cases were not decided until 2009 and 2007 respectively. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 662 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
43. See Sullivan, supra note 39, at 1618, 1620-22.
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without pleading at least enough facts to plead at least the concededly
light burden of stating a prima facie case.4 Other than observing the
issue as being potentially significant, it seems the status of the law on
this point is that if an inference of a violation can be created by facts
alleged irrespective of whether they fulfill all the elements of a prima
facie case, then Iqbal's requirements arguably are fulfilled. For,
meshing the two doctrines, it is plausibility pleading, not prima facie
case pleading, which is required-consistent with both lqbal and
Swierkiewicz.
D. Impact of Twombly andIqbal on Employment Discrimination
Litigation
Data collected as to the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on dismissal
of employment discrimination suits is conflicting and therefore
inconclusive. First, two studies gathered in one review showed an 11%
and 34.1% increase in motion to dismiss success rates, respectively. 45
Whereas another showed more motions to dismiss being filed but not a
higher dispositive dismissal rate.46 While another showed essentially no
increase in dismissals at the summary judgment stage from the tighter
pleading standard.47 The higher pleading keeps marginal cases from
being brought in the first place, and causes well-pled meritorious cases
being settled quickly. Thus muddling meaningful statistical analysis as
to dismissal rates without comparing impact on the rate of bringing such
cases and rendering summary judgment rate comparisons meaningless
other than noting that only well pleaded cases are more likely to survive
summary judgment if they survive motions to dismiss.
Finally, the Supreme Court observed, given the relatively
undemanding nature of "notice pleading," that the Court expected cases
to be filtered from juries by motions for summary judgment and not by
MTD's. 48
But, "notice pleading" has now morphed into more
44. See EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-cv-5291, 2013 WL 140604, at *4-7 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 11 2013); Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190-91 (4th Cir. 2010).
45. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REv. 1124, 1163
(2012).
46. See Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal 7-13
(Federal Judicial Center, 2011).
47.
See KEVIN P. McGOwAN, TWOMBLY AND IQBAL CAUSE SCANT CHANGE IN SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RESULTS 1 (2013), available at BNA.

48.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Before the shift to 'notice
pleading' accomplished by the Federal Rules, motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense
were the principal tools by which factually insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and
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demanding "plausibility pleading" as a result of Twombly & Iqbal
which, inexorably, gives a far greater "filtering" role to MTD's to screen
cases from ever reaching discovery, much less reaching juries. 49
Therefore, it may be said that now MTD's serve more strongly to abort a
claim before expensive discovery, whereas the motion for summary
judgment ("MSJ") serves potentially to bar the defendant from the cost
of a jury trial and the risk of a jury determination, or even the risk of a
runaway jury.
III. ROUND Two:

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS CRITICAL

ROUND IN EMPLOYERS' BATTLE TO AVOID JURY DETERMINATION
As shown, Twombly and 1qbal serve to heighten the basis for
MTD's as the first round of artillery in attempting to dispose of
employment discrimination law suits by motion testing the factual
adequacy of the face of the pleading as a matter of law.o If Round I
does not dispose of the suit, Round II is a motion for summary judgment
(MSJ). The MSJ goes far deeper: it tests the adequacy of the pleading in
light of the discovery record and affidavits, as a question of law to be
determined by a judge as a gatekeeper to the jury (and guardian of the
court's docket), as to whether that record demonstrates existence of a
genuine issue of material fact worthy of allowing the case to proceed to

prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private
resources. But with the advent of 'notice pleading,' the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this

function any more, and its place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 must
be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are
adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of
persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule,
prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis."(emphasis added)).
49. See Ashcroft v. lqbal 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
50.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. Employers' counsel may strategically
elect to not file an MTD so as to not educate plaintiff as to the existence of a dispositive defect in
the complaint which the plaintiff then can simply cure by filing a first amended complaint as a
matter of right under FRCP Rule 15(a). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The strategy of not
filing an MTD contemplates "locking in the error" until usually there is no remaining opportunity
for plaintiff to amend the complaint-such as during the summary judgment phase-and virtually
no opportunity to seek life support by seeking post MSJ additional discovery under the very limited
strictures of Rule 56(d) of the FRCP. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Murchison v. Astrue, 466
F. App'x 225 (4th Cir. 2012); Merchant v. Prince George's Cnty. Md., 436 F. App'x 218 (4th Cir.
2011). While the plaintiff may attempt to seek life support via leave to take additional post-MSJ
discovery under Rule 56(d), both the Rule and the cases are antagonistic to such attempts to seek a
life line through use of Rule 56(d). See generally Murchison, 466 F. App'x 218; Merchant, 436 F.
App'x 218.
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the jury."

The MSJ stage is the Holy Grail for both parties: defeat of an
employer's MSJ frequently amounts to a "win" by the plaintiff because
she could force a settlement with statutory attorneys' fee award against
an employer not willing to risk a jury determination of liability.5 2
Conversely, for the employer, an MSJ not only shuts down the exposure
and continuing high cost of litigation, but also strategically sends an
important signal to employees waiting in the wings hoping for some
quick settlement money, to not file their own copy-cat claims.53
A. The Case Law Allows MSJ's to Transform the Jury Issue ofIntent
into a Legal Questionfor the Court, Hence Creatinga Device to Keep
the Casefrom the Jury
The foundation of summary judgment practice is FRCP Rule 56 as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the summary judgment trilogy of
1986 ("Trilogy").5 4 At least two aspects of the Trilogy in combination

have elevated summary judgment practice in employment discrimination
litigation into a case-dispositive art form. First, as Justice Rehnquist
unapologetically made clear to the lower courts, the MSJ device should
not be avoided because of its harshness in shutting down access to a
jury. Rather, as he mandatedto the lower courts: "Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut,
but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
51.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 572 (1986). MSJ
entails a de novo review of the record for whether there is a genuine issue of material fact under
properly applied substantive law. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 116667 (4th. Cir. 1988). And, "[a]s the non-movant, [plaintiff] is entitled to have the court view the facts
most favorably to her claims." Dunbar v. Md. Primary Care Physicians, LLC, No. Civ. AMD0402663, 2005 WL 1259631, at *1 (D. Md. May 27, 2005). In addition, when considering an MSJ,
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the plaintiffs favor, "in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 US at 587 (quoting United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). Also, the court is not to make credibility resolutions in
deciding MSJ's. See id Such inferences may be supported by circumstantial evidence; thus,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to defeat an MSJ by creating a pretext question for the jury.
Bowman v. Holopack Int'l Corp., C.A. No. 3:06-1648-CMC-BM, 2007 WL 4481130, at *13 -15
(D.S.C. Dec. 19, 2007).
52.
See Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 689,
698-99 (2012).
53. See id
54. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita, 475 U.S. 572 (1986).
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
55.
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every action."' 56 Second, the determination of whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact requiring trial under Rule 56 is to
determine in light of the substantive law of the cause of action pled: "the
substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes
that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted."57
This combination is potentially devastating to the employment
discrimination plaintiff because the Supreme Court has turned the
essential statutory task of plaintiff to show existence of enough evidence
to establish a "pretext case"-namely, the falsity, or the reason to
disbelieve, the employer's assigned reason for its action-into one which
the employer can strategize effective placement of the goal posts to
effectively hog tie the plaintiff from being able to kick the ball to the
jury.
Because summary judgment turns on the question of law of whether
there is sufficient material fact dispute to get to a jury on an element of
the cause of action,58 it is necessary to summarize the basic elements of a
typical Title VII case. As the courts have recognized, it is the rare case
where the plaintiff has direct evidence of the decision maker deciding
the challenged employment action on discriminatory grounds; for
instance "I am firing you and hiring a man because we have too many
women working on the assembly line."5 Such a rare case immediately
creates a genuine issue of material fact as to motivation sufficient to
create a jury question of intent irrespective of what the employer
explains in defense.o
Rather, in most cases, the evidence of discriminatory intent is
circumstantial rather than direct, because the typical employment
discrimination plaintiff does not have adequate access to evidence upon
56.
Id. at 327 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
57.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added).
58. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(d).
59. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) ("[T]here
will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony to the employer's mental processes."); Hruska v. Forest Pres.
Dist. Of Cook Cnty., Ill., No. 10 C 7433, 2013 WL 1195699, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21 2013)
("Hruska presents no direct evidence of that nature, which is not surprising given that, in this day
and age, employers and managers rarely admit to having engaged in discrimination.").
60.
See Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("[T]he
McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence
of
discrimination."). Cases presenting direct evidence of discrimination contemporaneously tied to the
decision-maker bypass the burden shifting paradigm of McDonnell Douglass / Burdine and their
progeny and go straight to the jury. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d
277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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which to convert a merely plausible claim into a potentially jury-triable
claim of discriminatory motivation based on genuine issue of material
fact as to discriminatory intent. 6' Therefore, the Supreme Court has
created a construct of shifting burdens to enable the plaintiff an
opportunity to mount an inference of discriminatory motivation
(assuming a plausible claim is pled in the first place) sufficient to get to
a jury. 6 2

The seminal case here is McDonnell Douglas v. Green.63 There,
recognizing the usual absence of plaintiffs' access to direct evidence of
discrimination, the Supreme Court created the ability of plaintiff to
create an evidentiary inference of discrimination by creating a prima
facie case.64 While the prima facie framework is flexible to the kind of
case being pled, the mold is essentially a variation on this example: (i) I
am woman who is qualified for promotion to supervisor; (ii) despite the
opening, my application for the job, and superior qualifications, the
employer hired a less qualified male; (iii) therefore, I have been
discriminated on the basis of my sex. 65 Such prima facie case
allegations create an evidentiary inference in favor of the plaintiff that
the employer has discriminated against her at the summary judgment
stage, if shown to be supported by sufficient evidence.66 While it is the
plaintiffs burden to prove a prima facie case, in order to gain the
inference to force the employer to respond, that burden is concededly
easy for plaintiff to fulfill. 67 That said, it is important to note that if the

plaintiff nonetheless fails to supply evidence to fulfill an (meaning
"any") element of the prima facie case, the analysis stops short at that
point and the employer wins on summary judgment, due to plaintiffs
failure to show existence of any evidence, much less a genuine dispute
of material fact, in support of an essential element (the prima facie case)
of the cause of action. 68 The Supreme Court stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
61. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973) (showing
circumstantial evidence allowed for plaintiff to create a claim of discriminatory intent).
62. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
63. McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792.
64. Id. at 802.
65. See generally id. (establishing the requirements for a prima facie case of racial
discrimination).
66.
See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("McDonnell Douglas
raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained,
are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.").
67. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 ("The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment is not onerous.").

68.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
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summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can
be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.69
Thus, for instance, if the employer can show, after plaintiffs
opportunity for discovery, that, in the hypothetical prima facie case
example above, the plaintiff has offered no evidence of the male's
qualifications or no evidence of his qualifications being inferior to hers,
then the plaintiff fails to mount a prima facie case, rendering summary
judgment for the employer appropriate without more, due to failure of
proof to mount a prima facie case-that being an essential element of the
claim. 70

But, given the relative ease of mounting the prima facie case, most
employment discrimination claims meet that burden (or perhaps should
not be filed in the first place). 7 1 The next (second) step of the analytical
paradigm is for the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory
business reason for its action ("LNBR"). 72 For, example, in the
hypothetical above, the employer may assert as a legitimate
nondiscriminatory business reason that the male was selected because,
notwithstanding that he had less production line experience than the
plaintiff, the assembly lines frequently broke idling many employees and
he had the skill which plaintiff lacked to quickly repair the problem and
get everyone back to work, avoiding the employer's loss of expensive
collective down time. It is important to note at this point that (i) the
employer's mere articulation of a LNBR neutralizes the prima facie
case, and that (ii) the employer's burden is merely one of articulating a
LNBR - not a burden of proof as to the validity of the reason but is
merely an insignificant burden of production-the "burden" of merely
stating (or, perhaps, coming up with) a legitimate nondiscriminatory
business reason-something other than discrimination-for the
employer's action.

69. Id.
70.
See, e.g., Coleman v. ARC Auto., 255 F. App'x 948, 951 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case essential to her claim).
71.
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
72. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
73.
See Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 77
(2011). The mechanistic nature of this burden shifting process has been persuasively argued by
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Assuming the plaintiff has met her relatively easy burden of proof
of mounting a prima facie case and that the employer has met its even
easier burden of merely stating some (any) LNBR for its action,74 the
pendulum swings back to the plaintiff for the "main event" in the typical
employment discrimination case: whether the plaintiff can survive a
summary judgment motion by carrying its burden of proof to mount a
pretext case." This is the third step of the analytical paradigm. 76 It
serves to "frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity" (employer
action taken, and its reason given for the action)7 7 for plaintiff then to be
able to focus on attempting to show existence of a factual issue to
discredit the reason asserted (that the reason is false or not worthy of
belief), and thereby get to the jury to allow it to infer that the real reason
was discrimination.78 This step requires the plaintiff to create a genuine
issue of material fact that the employer's LNBR is not legitimate-that it
is false, inaccurate, not believable, or perhaps most significantly, is
accompanied by evidence of the employer's mendacity.7 9 A genuine
Professor Sperino to overemphasize adherence to the formula rather than to hew the statute - this,
for instance, by allowing the case to end on the failure to show the employer's reason to be false
when, indeed, the reason may be true but nonetheless still be a mask for "embedded
discrimination". See id. at 96.
74. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (illustrating the
elements necessary for a plaintiff to meet the burden of a prima facie case and what burden the
employer faces after that burden is met).
75. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
804 (1973). The burden of proof is always the plaintiff's in employment discrimination cases; the
employer's burden of articulating a LNBR is merely a burden of offering-not proving-a reason
(merely a burden of "articulation"-not a burden of proof-whereas the plaintiff bears the burden
of proof of disbelief of the employer's reasons). See id.
76. See id.
77.
See id. at 255-56.
78.
See, Wesley v. Arlington Cnty., 354 F. App'x 775, 781-83 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that
reasonable jury could find that the actions taken by the employer were pretext, based on his actions
in reviewing the candidate's promotion application); EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846,
852 -54 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining the shifting reason given for employment decision, and late
appearance of the reason in litigation suggesting the reason was a post hoc rationalization for

employer action, which can support the pretext case) (citations omitted); Murray v. Akima Corp.,
No. 4:07-CV-175-FL., 2009 WL 674395, at *6-7 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 2009) (holding that a pretext
case is mounted when there is conflicting evidence offered as to who made the challenged
employment decision based on an interview, together with conflicting evidence as to whether the

alleged decision maker even attended the employment interview) (citations omitted); Webb v.
Starbucks Corp., No. 1:07cv271, 2008 WL 4891106, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 12, 2008) (citing Smith
v. First Uniion Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 248 (4th Cir. 2000) (illustrating that plaintiff met her
burden by showing conflicting evidence that was relied upon by employer when making a decision
regarding her employment: discharge for poor work was contradicted by good job evaluations).
79.
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. V. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) ("The factfinder's
disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a
suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
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issue of material fact created by the plaintiff, through discovery or
affidavit that the employer's asserted LNBR is false or not believable,
permits (but does not require) the jury to infer that the employer's
unworthy reason was a cover up for discriminatory reason being
unmasked.so
Thus, the crux of a Title VII case-assuming plaintiff s mounting a
prima facie case and the employer's neutralizing it by articulating a
LNBR, turns on whether the plaintiff can mount a "pretext case." In
other words, can the plaintiff mount a genuine issue of material fact as to
the falsity or disbelief of the employer's LNBR, sufficient to survive the
employer's MSJ and get the case to the jury?8 1 That is the "main event"
82-*
in employment discrimination motions practice -with the plaintiff
attempting to mount a genuine issue of material fact to get to the jury,
and the employer attempting to maneuver around the discovery record
land mines to attempt analytically to structure a factual pathway that
avoids or legally neuters the claimed (or anticipated) genuine issue of
material fact (by showing such to be not genuine83 or not
material/immaterial).
intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier
of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination . . . .").
80.
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000) (illustrating
disbelief of the employer's reason permits-but does not require-thejury to infer discrimination as
the motivation for the employer's action).
81.
See Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment as a Theory of Discrimination: The
Need for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 4, 15 (2005).

82. Id. at 10 ("[T]he significance of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine lies in the Court's elevation
of the issue of 'pretext' as the cornerstone of a plaintiffs case, and the instruction to lower courts
that plaintiffs can prove discrimination indirectly by attacking the employer's explanation as
untrue.").

83. The concept of "genuine" issue for summary judgment purposes can be a bit misleading.
It is perhaps better viewed as addressing the sufficiency of the evidence rather than its bona fides:
"[A]ll that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to
require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l
Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968) (emphasis added). Thus, what is
important is the concept of "sufficiency" in an MSJ contest effectively allows the court to determine
as a matter of law whether the quantum offactual evidence disputed is enough to allow the fact

determination to get to a jury.

Stated otherwise, fact issues do not get to the jury if the court

determines the quantum of disputed factual evidence to be insufficient. Effectively, therefore, the
court makes a determination of the facts as a matter of law rather than as a matter of jury
determination. Further, not only does the court determine sufficiency offacts under the rubric of
"genuine" but also determines as a matter of law if the disputed facts are material to an element of
the cause of action: "More important for present purposes, summary judgment will not lie if the

dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). Lastly, under Rule 56, the movant must be entitled to "judgment as a matter of law"meaning also that the movant's position must comport with the substantive law.
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As to the viability of employers' use of MSJs to disarm the attempt
at creating a genuine issue of material fact to survive the MSJ, it must be
recalled that the issue of adequacy of a genuine issue of material fact is a
question of law for the court. 8 4 It is in that fine niche that the courtmade law thrice twists the inquiry against the plaintiff, in that: first, it
effectively twists the inquiry on MSJ from statutory inquiry of proof of
discrimination into plaintiffs burden of proving the falsity or disbelief
of the LNBR as to which explanation the employer controls and can
strategically deploy or refine (or withhold until MSJ) the evidence or its
emphasis;8 second, it deals away the presumption of summary judgment
analysis that inferences are to be determined against the movant;" and
third-central to this article-the courts have compounded this death
spiral for plaintiffs by having created a slew of devices to neutralize
pieces of evidence of discrimination into non-evidence-effectively
turning evidence of discrimination for the jury into questions of law for
the court to decide upon MSJ and thereby keep the case from ever
getting to the jury (and to allow the court, as well, to prune its docket).
These mechanisms are examined below.
B. The Employer's TacticalAdvantage in Getting to Summary Judgment
MSJ's are high stakes devices expected-or deployed by ambush-

84.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a); supra note 51 and accompanying text.
85.
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi! ": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of
McDonnel Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 100-01(2003).
This is an almost farcical feature of the McDonnell Douglas minuet; it never

requires the defendant to truly "defend." Instead, it sets the case up for summary
judgment by requiring the plaintiff to prove not only a prima facie case, but to
effectively start over again by mounting evidence to attack an assertion-not a fact that
will necessarily be proven at trial-that is the employer's mere articulation. Indeed, in
order to grant summary judgment in favor of an employer, the court must effectively
ignore the admonition to draw all inferences in the plaintiffs (nonmoving party's) favor.

Yet trial might well demolish the defendant's articulation like a house of cards-as it did
in the Costa case itself By not requiring the defendant to prove the reason for its
actions, the articulation feature is a major cop-out that allows the defendant, who already
(at least in an organizational sense) possesses a monopoly over information about its
action, to remain silently defiant about the details with the expectation that the plaintiff
will not be able to survive summary judgment and put the defendant's articulated reason
to the test at trial.

Id. at 101 (footnotes omitted).
86. See id. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
158-59 (1970)) (applying the standard that "the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to drawn in his favor").
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in most employment discrimination cases.
As a result, employers
attempt to position the case from the outset to attempt both a prevention
of a prima facie case and/or mount an LNBR for its challenged
employment decision in such a manner as to prevent the plaintiff from
establishing a "pretext case," and therefore, attempting to weave a multitiered path to a successful MSJ by using several bases for the court to
award summary judgment.88
The employer has a huge tactical advantage here because it usually
has access to facts that a plaintiff does not; 89 and by finding out through
admissions in discovery what a plaintiff does not know, the employer
can orchestrate the factual mosaic so as to make the employer's
legitimate business decision to be undisputed by positing it based on
what plaintiff admits it does not know-and what the employer can then
craft knowingly without opposition-thereby preventing a plaintiff from
mounting a pretext case and assuring the employer's success on its
MSJ. 90
For example, assume hypothetically that a female sex
discrimination plaintiff testified at deposition that her male supervisor,
who had made repeated sexist comments in the workplace, notified her
that she was being terminated from her assembly line worker position in
a reduction in force ("RIF"), while a junior, less competent male on the
same assembly line was not subjected to a RIF. Further, assume that: (i)
the plaintiff also testified in a deposition that she was uncertain who
made the RIF selection decision, but was certain it was gender based
because the supervisor had just made yet another offensive sexist
comment to her the day before the RIF; (ii) that the supervisor testified
in deposition that the Human Resources Manager made the RIF selection
decision speculating that it perhaps was due to plaintiff having a high
tardiness rate affecting the entire assembly line, but he was uncertain of
the basis for the HR Manager's selection decision; and (iii) the Human
87.
See JOAN M. GILBRIDE, N.Y. CNTY. LAWYER'S ASS'N, How TO HANDLE AN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE: PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS AND TRIAL STRATEGIES FROM THE
DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE
1 (2013), available at http://www.kbrlaw.com/gilbride3.pdf

(suggesting that summary judgment motions can be "a powerful tool in resolving employment
discrimination cases before trial ... [and] should be used frequently. . . .").
88. See Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the "No Spittin, No Cussin' and No Summary
Judgment" Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the "Defendant's Summary Judgment

Affirmed Without Comment" Days, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 705 (2012-13) (discussing
"increasingly subtle discrimination" and the ability of employers to "avoid certain patterns of
behavior to preclude claims of discrimination.").
89. Kaminshine, supra note 81, at 9.
90. See Van Detta, supra note 85, at 104 (stating that after St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993), the plaintiff must prove that all reasons suggested by the employer are "false
and camouflage for discriminatory reasons").
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Resources Manager was not deposed by plaintiff. Assume the plaintiff
thereby established a prima facie case that the senior, more competent
female was RIF'd while the less competent male was not, hence the
employer must establish the minimal burden of production (not proof) of
articulating an LNBR for selecting the plaintiff for RIF. The admission
that the plaintiff does not know who made the decision opens the field
for the employer to identify an untainted decision-maker, such as the
human resources manager, who states by affidavit 91 (after the close of
discovery 92) that she made the decision for RIF and did so on the basis
of plaintiffs frequent tardiness which, was the worst on the assembly
line, that the HR representative had no knowledge of the supervisor's
sexist comments because plaintiff never complained to her about it, that
she relied only on attendance records in the HR office, and that no one
else was RIF'd. The employer moves for summary judgment on the
basis of having articulated an LNBR for the termination-highest rate of
tardiness-as to which there is no pretext case mounted. It is undisputed
that the supervisor's sexist comments-conceding they were madecould not possibly have played a role in the RIF decision because it was
made by the HR Manager who not only made no such comments but
never even knew of the supervisor having made them. The employer
has maneuvered the plaintiff into a legal summary judgment headlock.
The law allowed it to position its summary judgment analysis into a
pathway through the summary judgment record evidence to selectively
assert a reason as to why it prevented plaintiff from creating a genuine
issue of material fact as to pretext. Thus allowing the legitimate
nondiscriminatory business reason of the employer to stand
unchallenged and summary judgment granted, due to plaintiffs failure
to create a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of its
case. The sexist comments of the supervisor do not raise a pretext case

See FED, R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) ("An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a
91.
motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence,
and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.").
92. Many plaintiffs-at their peril and the employer's opportunity-fail to take full
advantage of deposition opportunities due to their cost, and employers can minimize the value of
interrogatories to plaintiff through muffled responses which really do not tie the employer down.
See generally REBECCA M. HAMBURG & MATTHEW C. KOSKI, NAT'L EMP'T LAWYERS ASS'N,
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF NELA MEMBERS, FALL 2009, at

8, 11 (2010) (stating that survey takers found discovery to be too expensive and "abused in almost
every case"). For instance, in the subject hypothetical, a plaintiffs interrogatory as to why she was
selected for RIF might nonspecifically respond "due to job related problems affecting the entire
assembly line"-answers which leave the employer wide berth to refine its consistent reason at the

MSJ stage.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol32/iss1/3

18

Semler: Hijacking of Title VII Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs on th
2014]

HIJACKING OF TITLE VII

67

because comments by non-decision-makers are not material.93 Worse,
the plaintiff, who may have been sandbagged by the assertion of the
"tardiness" reason, when she was expecting, but failed adequately to
probe for a "seniority-based" reason. This is the potential end run upon
evidence not adduced by the plaintiff during discovery. For example, if
the supervisor suggested to the Human Resources Manager that the
selection decision be based on tardiness rather than seniority - to "get"
the woman whom he did not like having. Had that been uncovered, a
pretext case potentially could have been established on the basis of the
"cat's paw" doctrine, which imputes the influence of the sexist
supervisor to the asserted neutral decision-maker if there is evidence that
the supervisor influenced the decision.9 4
As a result of the aforementioned series of court decisions as to
both summary judgment and substantive employment discrimination,
this substantial tactical advantage permits the employer to select what to
assert as the reason for its action-but not have to prove it-and when to
assert it, such as after discovery at the MSJ stage based on potential gaps
in the discovery record. Indeed, the employer may attempt to do so by
positioning a pathway consistent with the summary judgment record,
knowing that the plaintiff cannot have any evidence to controvert and
will therefore be unable to mount a pretext case to reach the jury.95 The
employer may maneuver in such a way that makes it impossible for the
plaintiff to carry its burden of disproving a reason which the employer
has only the burden to assert-while creating minimized exposure to
discovery-but not to prove. Allowing the employer to assert a reason
based on gaps or admissions in the discovery record, which the employer
need not prove but the plaintiff nonetheless must create a genuine issue
of material fact to disprove, gives a huge tactical advantage to the
employer. 96
93. See Murry v. Jacobs Tech., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-771, 2012 WL 1145938, at *8 (M.D.N.C.
Apr. 5, 2012) (citing Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir.
2004)) ("Statements by employees who are not decision-makers do not bear on the contested
employment decision; even statements by those making the decision to terminate an employee-but
which are unrelated to the decisional process itself-do not satisfy a plaintiff's burden of proving
discrimination."), aff'dper curiam, 568 Fed. App'x 265 (4th Cir. 2014).
94. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190 (2011).
95. See supratext accompanying notes 89-90.
96.
See Van Detta, supra note 85, at 85 ("[Justice] Powell's changes [in tinkering with Title
VII] have actually worked to the detriment of many plaintiffs . . . .").
[The pretext inquiry] forces the plaintiff to address a second, entirely different intent
question-the question specifically addressed to discrediting whatever alibi the
defendant happens to offer. . . . Shifting the "intent" inquiry into a pretext mode places
control of the case entirely in the defendant's hands with no corresponding burden of
production or proof to detain it.
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More fundamentally, the substantive law paradigm that evolved has
upended the statute by turning the statutory inquiry of intentional
discrimination (intentional sex discrimination in the above example) into
a different inquiry by placing a burden on the plaintiff to disprove a
reason strategically asserted by the employer. 9 7 In contrast the employer
has no burden other than to merely assert a position on summary
judgment after surveying the latitude that the summary judgment record
allows in order to strategically box in the plaintiff.98 Therefore the net
effect is that the operative statutory factual discriminatory motivation
question and its forum of jury determination has instead been converted
into an entirely different question of law to be determined by the
different forum of a judge; one who is prone to use or create legal
devices to neuter potentially probative evidence in order to prune the
court's docket. 99
Stated otherwise, by the employer utilizing the legal device of
articulating any reason for its action as to which it has no burden of
proof, the inquiry shifts to the plaintiff to show the falsity of that reason,
effectively marginalizing or sidetracking altogether the statutory inquiry
of discriminatory intent.'oo Compounding this substitution of the factual
inquiry for a legal inquiry, the employer can manipulate discovery so as
to put the plaintiff in the trick-box of admitting it does not know the
business reason for the action it complains of, or does not know who
made the decision. 101 Such a move facilitates the employer's ability to
strategically select from a potential menu of reasons, a bullet-proof
reason for its action--one over which it knows the plaintiff cannot
possibly create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to get to a
jury-and thereby allows the employer to prevent the case from ever
reaching the jury.
In addition to this paradigm shift from a jury inquiry of
discriminatory intent to, instead, having to disprove the employer's
reasons in order to get to a jury, courts have effectively made the
employee/plaintiff's burden even higher by further increasing the hurdle
to overcome summary judgment through judicially created tools. 102

Id at 102.
97. See id at 90.
98. See id. at 90 ("[T]he employer must simply place its hand on its hip, chin in hand,
inventory possible excuses for a discriminatory decision, and throw one out to see if it will stick.").
99.

100.
prove not
101.
102.

See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Bennett, supra note 88, at 707-08.

See Van Detta, supra note 85, at 91 ("[Now] the plaintiff has the additional burden to
only that the defendant is a discriminator, but also a liar.").
See id at9l.
See Bennett, supra note 88, at 708-09.
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Courts have created all manner of case-law devices to convert factual
evidence of discriminatory intent as putative jury issues, into, issues of
law for judges to dispose of in a manner that will keep them from ever
getting to the jury in the first place.
This all reflects a self-protective calendar control bias of the courts
rather than a fidelity to the statutorily mandated inquiry; indeed it may
be a legitimate reaction to many lawsuits being filed like buying a lottery
ticket or by plaintiffs' attorneys knowing that many employers would
prefer to pay to settle a claim expeditiously rather than engage in a more
expensive fight.1 0 3 It remains that the baby may wind up being thrown
out with the bathwater in efforts to achieve calendar control through the
creation of judicial devices rather than through the congressionally
mandated jury determination of claims of intentional discrimination.
Indeed, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
the Supreme Court candidly admitted outright that restrictive
interpretations of Title VII are appropriate as a docket control measure
for judicial implementation.1 04
C. Courts Have CreatedEvidence NeuteringDevices to Facilitatethe
Grantingof Summary Judgment Motions
Courts have increasingly created "evidence-neutering devices"
which serve to convert potential jury-determination factual evidence of
discrimination into court-determined legal issues which, in turn, are used
to dispose of the case on summary judgment to keep it from ever
reaching a jury. 05 Some of these evidence-neutering devices are
discussed below. The first three are required by Rule 56106 and the rest
103. See id. at 701.
104. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct 2517, 2531-2532 (2013)
(establishing higher pleading requirements for showing causation in retaliation claims).
The proper interpretation and implementation of § 2000e-3(a) and its causation
standard have central importance to the fair and responsible allocation of resources in the
judicial and litigation systems. This is of particular significance because claims of
retaliation are being made with ever-increasing frequency. The number of these claims
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has nearly doubled
in the past 15 years-from just over 16,000 in 1997 to over 31,000 in 2012. Indeed, the
number of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has now outstripped those for every
type of status-based discrimination except race.
In addition, lessening the causation standard could also contribute to the filing of
frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from efforts by employer, administrative
agencies, and courts to combat workplace harassment.
Id. (citations omitted).
105. See Bennett, supra note 88, at 708-09.
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), (c)(4).
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are purely judge-made devices which neuter potential evidence to
become not genuine, not material, or incompetent as to evidentiary value
under Rule 56.107
1. "Genuine"
As noted above, the courts will not allow a factual dispute to get to
a jury unless it is "genuine"-meaning there is sufficient evidence of the
fact being disputed. 0 8
2. "Material"
As also noted above, the courts will not allow a genuine factual
dispute to reach the jury unless the dispute is "material"-meaning the
fact is potentially outcome-determinative under the substantive law of
the cause of action at issue.1 09
3. Affidavits on Personal Knowledge
Rule 56(c)(4) allows any party to support or resist MSJ by
supplying affidavits. 10 In the case of the plaintiff, this is usually used to
show existence of controverted evidence in order to demonstrate a prima
facie case, impeach the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory
business reason, or show the existence of direct evidence of

107. See discussion infra Part II.C.4-C.18.
108. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50
(1986) ("[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.. . . If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative summary judgment may be granted.");
see also, e.g., Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 167, 176 (4th Cir. 1988).
On the record, it is arguable that any "dispute" as to what was said on this critical
occasion was not a "genuine" one, for an apparent dispute is not "genuine" within
contemplation of the summary judgment rule unless the non-movant's version is
supported by sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find the fact in his favor.
Stone, 855 F.2d at 175 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-52).
109. See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 56(a); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.. . . [W]hile the materiality determination rests on the
substantive law, it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and
which facts are irrelevant that governs.
Anderson, 477 at 248 (citation omitted).
110. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c)(4).
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discrimination."' However, the Rule requires any such evidence to be
based on "personal knowledge" and that the evidence therein be
"competent".1 2 Therefore, a plaintiffs affidavit proffered for purposes
of attempting to create a genuine issue of material fact to get to the jury
will be disregarded by the court, as a matter of law, if purporting direct
evidence of discrimination which is not based on the plaintiffs own
personal knowledge."

3

4. Conclusory Evidence
To survive an MSJ, the plaintiff must demonstrate that there are
genuine, specific material facts controverted; mere conclusions of law
couched as facts do not meet that requirement.114
5. Conjecture Evidence
As a variant of the "no conclusory statement" principle, a plaintiff
cannot overcome an otherwise proper MSJ by asserting conjecture or
speculation as "fact."" 5
6. "Stray Remarks"
Many cases present potential direct evidence of discriminatory
animus which could frame an issue of intentional discrimination for jury
determination. However, this potential fact dispute may be neutered by
Ill. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4).
113. See Orange v. Fielding, 517 F. Supp. 2d 776, 783 (D.S.C. 2007) ("[I]n the absence of an
affirmative showing of personal knowledge of specific facts, a court cannot consider such an
affidavit in making its summary judgment determination." (quoting Guseh v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 423
F. Supp. 2d 550, 555 (M.D.N.C. 2005), aff'd per curiam, 206 Fed. App'x 255 (2006))).
114. See Camey v. Am. Univ., 960 F. Supp. 436, 439 (D.D.C. 1997), rev'don other grounds,
151 F.3d 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
[R]ule 56 places a burden on the nonmoving party "to go beyond the
pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial."

The nonmovant cannot survive a motion

for summary judgment by relying on "metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts." In addition, neither the nonmovant's conjecture and surmise nor mere
"conclusory allegations of discrimination, without more" are sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Id. (citations omitted).

115. See Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[The
plaintiffs] own naked opinion, without more, is not enough to establish a primafacie cause of []
discrimination." (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

23

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 3
72

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:49

the court, as a matter of law, as being a "stray remark"-effectively
applying the Rule 56 "genuine" requirement to neuter the evidence as
being quantitatively insufficient as a matter of law to merit submission
of the intent issue to a jury. 116 Especially when the case is in the posture
of a pretext case, the strength of the employer's LNBR can be deemed
unimpeached by potentially inculpatory evidence which is recast as
merely a the "stray remark."' This can divert the statutory inquiry of
intent determination from the jury to the court."'8 However, whether a
claimed stray remark will be discounted as a matter of law, or be deemed
to raise a jury issue of intentional discrimination, entails a fact-intensive
analysis for the court, usually turning on such variables as whether the
remark was made by the decision-maker, tied to the decision, and
temporally related to the decision. 119
7. "Isolated Event"
Closely related to the stray remark doctrine, is the "isolated event"
doctrine, which is somewhat analogous to the tort concept that "every
dog gets one free bite!" 20 The isolated event doctrine neuters, as a
matter of law, evidence of discrimination from being worthy of getting
to a jury by effectively giving the employer or supervisor a free pass due
to exuberance or asserted context or rationalization of a statement or act
otherwise suggestive of discriminatory intent.121 Indeed, sometimes in

116. See Bunk v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 408 F. Supp. 2d 153, 158 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding
that comments allegedly made by hiring personnel do not "constitute sufficient evidence of
discriminatory intent and are merely 'stray remarks"'). However, "[s]tray remarks, even if they
occurred as plaintiff claims, are not enough to satisfy the plaintiffs burden of proving pretext.
Stray remarks alone do not create an issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment." Id. But
see Shapiro v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 561 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that
although "it is true that the stray remarks of a decision-maker, without more, cannot prove a claim
of employment discrimination, we have held that when other indicia of discrimination are properly
presented, the remarks can no longer be deemed stray and the jury has a right to conclude that they
bear a more ominous significance" (quoting Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, 239 F.3d 456, 468)),
affdsub nom. Cruz v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 376 Fed. App'x 82 (2d Cir. 2010).
117. See Bunk, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (ruling that "even if the instances upon which plaintiff
relies could be construed as some evidence of pretext ... summary judgment is [still] warranted").
118. See, e.g., id. at 159-60.
119. See Silver v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 490 F. Supp. 2d 354, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
120. Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506, 510 (Idaho 1990) ("Reduced to its essence, the
'prior similar incidents' requirement translates into the familiar but fallacious saying in negligence
law that every dog gets one free bite before its owner can be held to be negligent for failing to
control the dog.").
121. Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 608 (4th Cir. 1999) ("To survive
summary judgment on the basis of direct and indirect evidence, [the plaintiff] must produce
evidence that clearly indicates a discriminatory attitude at the workplace and must illustrate a nexus
between that negative attitude and the employment action.").
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the same case, multiple events, which might be deemed by a jury as
indicative of a pattern demonstrating pretext, are treated separately and
dismissed as isolated events not worthy of jury submission-thus
keeping the case from the jury on the basis of the court neutering
evidence as a matter of law.1 22
8. "Comparator" Evidence
Under the prima facie case rubric of McDonnell Douglas, the
plaintiff must show, for instance, that she was treated differently than a
similarly situated male ("the comparator"). 123 If the court determines as
a matter of law that the required comparator is not on all fours with the
plaintiff, the court may deem failure of a prima facie case and, on that
basis alone, grant summary judgment to the employer. 124 Some courts
employ strict comparator guidelines,' 25 while others are less strict.1 26 I
any event, the point is that it is the court determining a fact issue as a
matter of law: whether the comparator issue is close enough to the
plaintiff to allow the plaintiff s case to advance to the jury, or whether
the case should be dismissed on MSJ for failure to show a valid
comparator-once the judge has deemed it an essential element of the
cause of action.
9. Not a "Super-Personnel Agency"
On MSJ in employment discrimination cases, the courts frequently
are required, in determining existence of a pretext case, to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence of "pretext" for a jury determination
that the employer's asserted business reason is false or should not be

122. See, e.g., Carter v. Luminant Power Servs. Co., No. 3:10-CV-1486-L., 2011 WL
6090700, at *29-31 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2011) (holding that six incidents of derogatory racial
comments over eighteen months, including the display of a noose, were isolated comments not
raising a jury issue of discrimination, after parsing the context of such evidence), affd, 714 F.3d
268 (5th Cir. 2013).
123. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); supra Part IlI.B.
124. See Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1992).
125. See, e.g., Spence v. BHTT Entm't, Inc., No. 8:12-CV-694-T-33MAP, 2013 WL 3714016,
at *6-8 (M.D. Fla. July 15, 2013) ("A comparator must be nearly identical to the plaintiff to prevent
courts from second-guessing a reasonable decision by the employer." (quoting Dickinson v.
Springhill Hosps., Inc., 187 F. App'x 937, 939 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 598-600 (1lth Cir. 1994) ("The absence of
an establishment requirement permits the plaintiff to make a Title VII prima facie case on a showing
that she is female and her job was substantially similar to higher paying jobs occupied by males.")
(citing Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1529 (1lth Cir. 1992)).
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believed.1 27 Plaintiffs may attempt to show that the business reason is so
dumb or unreasonable as to be inherently unworthy of belief-as to be
pretextual; stated otherwise, a cover-up for discrimination.1 2 8 A court
may choose to dodge that issue by claiming that it does not sit as a
"super-personnel agency" that permits jury determinations of the
wisdom of an employer's purported business decisions.129 Thus, here
again, by court-made doctrine, the court may decide as a matter of law
that a pretext case is insufficient to advance to the jury by claiming it
does not sit to decide the wisdom of the employer's business decision,
despite the potential implausibility of the decision.
10. Not "Code of Civility"
Employers may be very demeaning to women or other minorities
by disrespectful treatment, which may constitute circumstantial evidence
of discriminatory intent.1 30 Yet, by recasting the potential factual
inference into a legal issue-that the statute does not serve to impose a
"code of civility"-the court can chose to neutralize, as a matter of law,
the potential jury inference and dispose of the case on that basis on
MSJ.131

127.

See Van Detta, supra note 85, at 102.

128. See id. at 103.
129. Client ID: Jarvis v. Enter. Fleet Servs. & Leasing Co., No. DKC 07-3385, 2010 WL
1068146, at *17 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2010), aff'd per curiam, 408 Fed. App'x 668 (4th Cir.
2011).
This court's task is not to sit, in this context, as a super personnel agency. It is not
enough for Plaintiff to allege pretext based on her own view of the truth; in order to rebut
Defendant's non-discriminatory reason, Plaintiffs task is to proffer evidence showing
that Defendant's stated reason was not the real reason for its actions. Plaintiff has
proffered no such evidence and Defendant's motion for summary judgment will
therefore be granted.

Id (quoting Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 615 (D. Md. 2003), aff'dper curiam, 85
Fed. App'x 960 (4th Cir. 2004)).
130. See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) ("In these
circumstances, Griffith must produce sufficient circumstantial evidence of illegal discrimination
under the McDonnell Douglas paradigm-by presenting a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination plus sufficient evidence that one or more of the City's proffered nondiscriminatory
reasons is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.").

131. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serys., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (holding that allowing
same sex harassment to be subject to Title VII's protections does not thereby "transform Title VII
into a general civility code for the American workplace"); see also Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736
(requiring a plaintiff lacking evidence that "clearly points" to intentional discrimination to create an

inference of the discrimination that will justify review by a jury).
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11. Not the "Decision-Maker"
The law recognizes the logic of inferring discriminatory purpose of
an employment action from the fact that the person who decided the
employment action also made discriminatory comments. 132 Conversely,
it follows that discriminatory comments made by non-decision-makers
are less probative of discriminatory purpose as to the challenged
employment decision. This principle allows room for inventiveness on
MSJ by-depending on what gaps and admissions of "I don't know who
made the decision" on the summary judgment record-the employer
may attempt to manipulate the record to characterize (or recharacterize)
the decision as having been made by someone other than the
discriminatory speaker. Thereby, on MSJ, the employer would attempt
to neutralize as a matter of law the otherwise jury triable issue arising
from the discriminatory decision having been made by the
discriminatory speaker.13 1

12. Inference of Absence of Discrimination
Also presented as a matter of logic, if the person who hired the
minority group member plaintiff also made the decision to terminate the
same person, that decision-maker earns an inference of
nondiscriminatory intent; if the decision-maker hired the minority
irrespective of that status, it suggests that decision-maker would not
terminate because of that very status. 134 Thus, on MSJ, the employer
may attempt to neutralize as a matter of law an inference of
discriminatory purpose by showing that the decision-maker made the
decision to hire the plaintiff and therefore could not be inferred to be

132. See Murray v. Jacobs Tech., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-771, 2012 WL 1145938, at*8 (M.D.N.C.
Apr. 5, 2012) (citing Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999)), affd per
curiam, 568 Fed. App'x 265 (4th Cir. 2014).
133. See id. at *9 (stating that AT&T provided evidence sufficient to show that the
discriminatory speaker played no part in the decision to terminate the plaintiff).
134. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797-98 (4th Cir. 1991).
One is quickly drawn to the realization that "claims that employer animus exists in
termination but not in hiring seem irrational." From the standpoint of the putative

discriminator, "it hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby
incurring the psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once they
are on the job." Therefore, in cases where the hirer and the firer are the same individual
and the termination of employment occurs within a relatively short time span following
the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for
the adverse action taken by the employer.
Id. at 797 (citation omitted).
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discriminatory by terminating the same employee.
13. "Equal Opportunity Jerk"
The plaintiff alleges harassment on the basis of sex due to the
supervisor calling her disparaging names. The employer responds on
MSJ that no such inference is permitted because the employer presents
evidence that the supervisor calls male employees equally disparaging
names. Stated otherwise, the comments are indicative of the supervisor
being ajerk but not a discriminatoryone; only the latter is proscribed by
Title VII, not the former.13 5
14. "No Scienter"
The employer who is accused of targeting minority group members
may contend that it was impossible for such to have been the intent
because the employer had no reason to know the plaintiffs minority
group status. 3 6 Thus, the defense on MSJ is that, as a matter of law,
there could be no action taken on the basis of minority status when
minority status is not known to the decision-maker.137
15. "Intervening Event"
The supervisor broods out loud that "there are too many women
working here." A week later, a woman is fired. She contends that the
discharge was due to her sex, as demonstrated by the supervisor's
contemporaneous comments. At the MSJ stage, however-after the
close of discovery-the employer moves for MSJ supported by an
affidavit from the company president contending that the employee was
fired by the company president due to reports, confirmed by
investigation, of the employee having just threatened the life of a
135.

See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000).

There may be cases in which a supervisor makes sexual overtures to workers of both
sexes or where the conduct complained of is equally offensive to male and female

workers. In such cases, sexual harassment would not be based on sex because men and
women are accorded like treatment. . .. and the plaintiff would have no remedy under
Title VII.
Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
136. See, e.g., Holmes v. Potter, 384 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2004).
137. See, e.g., id. ("Usually an employer's lack of knowledge about a protected category rings
a death knell for discrimination claims. '[T]here is no indication that [the employer] even knew
about the [protected activity] when [an adverse action took place]."' (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. V. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001))).
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company executive.
The affidavit further states that the company
president made the discharge decision on the basis of the alleged threat,
without any knowledge of the supervisor's sexist comments made a few
days earlier. The employer moves for summary judgment contending it
had no knowledge of the supervisor's sexist comments in deciding the
discharge and that it made the discharge decision on the basis of
removing exposure created by the alleged threat. By showing that the
employer relied on the threat as an intervening factor, the employer
breaks the inference of discriminatory causation created by the
supervisor's sexist comments. The employer, as a matter of law,
neutered the inference and removed any basis for jury determination of
discriminatory motivation by showing its action was based on the
nondiscriminatory intervening event. 38
16. Good Faith, but Incorrect, Belief of Decision-Maker; DecisionMaker's Perception Controls
Referring to the hypothetical in the previous paragraph where the
employer terminates female on the basis of the investigation confirming
a threat had been made by the employee on the life of the company
executive-assume the female denies having made any threat. Does the
plaintiffs denial of having made any threat create a genuine issue of
material fact, serving to defeat the employer's MSJ? No, because it is the
employer's goodfaith belief of the threat having been made that counts;
even if the employee did not make the threat, it is the employer's good
faith belief that the threat was made, as confirmed by its investigation,
that is sufficient as a matter of law to defeat the jury issue of
discriminatory purpose. 139

138. See Joseph v. Marco Polo Network, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 1597, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119713, at *54-56 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10,2010) ("Evidence of significant misconduct by a plaintiff that
fully justifies the adverse employment action and that occurs after the employee's protected activity
extinguishes the probative force that might arise from the proximity in time between the protected

activity and the adverse employment action." (citing Gubitosi v. Kapica, 154 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir.
1998))).
139. See Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2007).
Here, the uncontested evidence established that DeCesaris (the decision maker)
honestly believed that Holland deserved to be discharged for threatening Peck,
regardless of whether Holland did in fact issue the threats. Thus, Holland's evidence
failed to address whether DeCesaris did not honestly believe that the threats were made,
and ultimately, "[i]t is the perception of the decisionmaker which is relevant."
Id. "In assessing pretext, a court's focus must be on the perception of the decision maker, that is,
whether the employer believed its stated reason to be credible." Id. (quoting Azimi v. Jordan's
Meats, Inc. 456 F.3d 228, 246 (1st Cir. 2006)).
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17. Inconsistency as a Mere "Charitable Act" Rather Than Pretext
Ordinarily, inconsistencies in the employer's reasons for its
challenged action give rise to a classic jury-triable issue of pretext
because "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case,
suffice to show intentional discrimination."1 4 0 But, suppose the
employer's inconsistency was due to an attempt to lessen the financial
impact of the termination-on the employee, such as in the hypothetical
in the prior paragraph, by reporting to the unemployment compensation
agency that the employee was laid off for lack of work. In this scenario,
the employer reported this reason so the employee would still qualify for
unemployment compensation benefits, notwithstanding the employer's
termination due to belief of a threat having been made. Do these
conflicting reasons give rise to a pretext claim for the jury? No, because
the beneficent acts, unaccompanied by proof that they were a cover up
for a discriminatory purpose, do not give rise to a jury question of
pretext arising from the employer giving conflicting reasons for a
'

termination decision.14

18. Additional Consistent Reasons for Employer Action Are Not
"Shifting Reasons"
Shifting reasons for the employer's challenged action ordinarily
will give rise to a jury-triable question of pretext. 14 However, does the
employer's "piling on" of subsequently added, additional reasons for its
employment action, itself create a pretext issue by the piling on of such
additional reasons? No, it is inconsistent reasons that give rise to a
pretext case for a jury, whereas adding consistent reasons into the
summary judgment stage does not automatically create a pretext case
and, indeed, may help fortify the employer's MSJ based on an LNBR for
its action as to which the plaintiff cannot demonstrate pretext.143

140. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511; see Castro v. Devry Univ., Inc., 941
F. Supp. 2d 965, 990 (ND. Ill. 2013).
141. See Holland, 487 F.3d at 216-17 ("Once an employer has provided a non-discriminatory
explanation for its decision, the plaintiff cannot seek to expose that rationale as pretextual by
focusing on minor discrepancies that do not cast doubt on the explanation's validity . . . ." (quoting
Hux v. City of Newport News, 451 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2006))).
142. See Castro, 941 F.2d at 990 (acknowledging that "shifting reasons may indicate pretext").
143. See, e.g., Castro, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 989 ("While shifting reasons may indicate pretext,
the facts do not support the claim of such a shift or pretext here.").
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Do?

As shown above, the combination of summary judgment principles
and the substantive law framework for interpreting Title VII's burden
shifting frameworks, has developed a self-feeding system that serves to
detour the statutory inquiry and jettison from the judicial system cases in
which evidence suggests a jury triable issue of discrimination. This
article suggests one lesser administrative correction and two other
options for judicial reform. The administrative solution strives to
attempt to achieve greater resolution at the level of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in a manner required by
Congress, but ignored by the EEOC. The others attempt to either return
to adjudication by confronting the statutory issue straight-on or, instead,
to reform the judicially created frameworks which currently usurp
statutory purpose.
A. Administrative Reform: Abuse ofAutomatic Issuance of Right to Sue
Letters upon Request
Title VII requires conciliation or other similar actions by the
EEOC, when the Agency finds "reasonable cause" for a violation.1 44
The purpose of that congressional command is precisely to avoid
litigation in the federal courts and to promote amicable (non-judicial)
resolution of the dispute.1 4 5 Title VII attempts to accomplish this by
The fact that Hurt stressed Brooks' poor performance in a subsequent email to HR
Director Maher, whereas dishonesty was at the forefront of DA Berry's mind when she
testified at her deposition years later, does not demonstrate "shifting" reasons for the
termination. To raise a suspicion of pretext, Brooks must present evidence of a
"significant discrepancy" in the reasons offered by DeVry for her discharge. Concerns
about dishonesty versus performance are not sufficiently inconsistent to show pretext.
Id. (citation omitted).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) ("If the Commission determines after such investigation that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion." (emphasis added)).
145. See EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d. 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003) ("The
duty to conciliate is at the heart of Title VII. It clearly reflects a strong congressional desire for outof-court settlements of Title VII violations. It is a condition precedent to the Commission's power
to sue." (citations omitted)); EEOC v. Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc., 452 F. Supp. 678, 683 (M.D.
Fla. 1978).
The mandate that conciliation be attempted is unique to Title VII and it clearly reflects a
strong Congressional desire for out-of-court settlement of Title VII violations. The
legislative history of the 1972 amendments confirms that Congress viewed judicial relief
as a recourse of last resort, sought only after a settlement has been attempted and failed.
Conciliation is clearly the heart of the Title VII administrative process.
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allowing EEOC investigation and by withholding (for at least 300 days
in deferral states) charging parties' access to the courts, conditioning
court access upon EEOC's controlling issuance of "right-to-sue letters"
until the agency has investigated the charge and released itself from
further conciliation efforts-only then allowing the case to be brought in
court.146
To be sure, the courts usually will not inject themselves in
assessing the adequacy of the agency's conciliation efforts-that being a
matter of agency discretion.1 47
The adequacy of the agency's
conciliation-assuming it engaged in the effort at all-arguably is not a
task of the courts. 14 8
As an entirely different matter, flatly contrary to the express
language of the statute, the EEOC has arrogated unto itself the power to
issue right-to-sue letters without even investigating the charge, much less
attempting conciliation on a meritorious charge in order to attempt to
avoid judicial litigation. 14 9 It may do so merely upon the request of a
charging party, pursuant to a regulation the agency promulgated.' 5 0
Through such regulation, the EEOC has self-authorized itself to issue a
form-letter in response to a request from charging parties; essentially,
this permits the EEOC to automatically drop any investigation (much
less perform conciliation of a charge found to have cause) and to
instantly issue right-to-sue letters, a power the Agency reflexively
Sherwood Med., 452 F. Supp. At 683 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is
dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing
of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d)
[300 days in deferral states] of this section, whichever is later, the Commission has not
filed a civil action under this section . . . or the Commission has not entered into a

conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission ...
shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice
a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the
person claiming to be aggrieved.

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, note that plaintiff may file in court either when the agency
finds no cause and then issues a right-to-sue letter, or after cause is found and it declares

that conciliation has failed. See id.
147. EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171, 183 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to assess the
adequacy of EEOC's conciliation efforts), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (2014). But see Asplundh,
340 F.3d at 1261 (dismissing action due to EECO's perfunctory stab at conciliation not being in
compliance with statute).

148. See Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 183; cf Sherwood, 452 F. Supp. at 684 ("If the
Commission is to seek relief in federal court it must be prepared to show that it has satisfied the
jurisdictional prerequisites-including submitting the matters to conciliation . . . .This is a matter of
subject matter jurisdiction, not of Commission discretion." (emphasis added)).

149.
150.

See 29 C.F.R.
See id.

§

1601.28(a)(2) (2013).
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asserts in response to requests, asserting that it will not have time to
investigate.'
This is impermissible reformation of statute by regulation.1 52 It
results in encouraging litigation contrary to administrative procedures
that are statutorily mandated by Congress precisely to avoid such cases
winding up in the federal courts.1 5 3 Ironically, by thus avoiding the nonlitigated resolution intended by Congress, the agency is facilitating an
end run around the statute and allowing plaintiffs into court to face the
potential traps of MTD and MSJ.1 54 In short, the EEOC is part of the
problem in allowing so many cases to wind up in court on MSJ when
they should be-as Congress commanded-resolved outside of court by
the agency. 55

&

151. See Martini v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting
that the EEOC unlawfully sent a right-to-sue letter to the plaintiff before the 180 day statutory
waiting period had expired).
152. See, e.g., id. at 1347. There is a conflict in the circuits concerning the validity of this
EEOC regulation. Compare id, with Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1277
(10th Cir. 2001) ("We therefore uphold EEOC's reading, one that has been at least implicitly
accepted by Congress for over 23 years."), and Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship
Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding the validity of the regulation).
153. See Martini, 178 F.3d at 1347. Indeed, the only practical difference between a race
discrimination in employment case brought under Title VII and one brought under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (aside from the longer statute of limitations for the latter statute), is
the factor of EEOC investigation and conciliation. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012)
(empowering the EEOC to "prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment
practice"), with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (authorizing a private right of action for any civil rights
violation). Absent that, one wonders what was accomplished by enactment of a statute that adds
nothing-after having thus been neutered by the agency as to race discrimination in employment
cases. Note further, that "race" within the meaning of Section 1981 may also include suits for
alienage (ancestry, not national origin). See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613
(1987).
154. Arguably, an EEOC finding of "no cause" may give the charging party sufficient repose
to feel that she had her "fair day in court" with the matter adjudicated by a neutral, and thus obviate
litigation in the federal courts. See generally 29 C.F.R. 1601.19(a) (2014). Conversely, an Agency
finding of "cause" may serve the salutatory purpose of a conciliated resolution which would obviate
court litigation, which is precisely what congress intended. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a) (2014).
But, by allowing plaintiffs counsel to assert an Agency regulation to punt the case to federal court
instead of allowing an agency attempt at resolution, the plaintiff (more precisely, plaintiffs
attorney) is may be positioning herself for an award of attorneys' fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(2012) (permitting court to allow the prevailing party to recover attorney fees). Thus, the pursuit of
a court award of attorneys' fees may incentivize taking the case away from the Agency and pushing
it into court-thus creating cross purposes between the rationales for congressional mandate for
Agency resolution to avoid litigation versus congressional award of attorneys' fees for successfully
bringing a Title VII suit.
155. By allowing the bypass around the agency intervention, the agency has effectively
abrogated any real difference in race-based claims between Title VII and the pre-existing Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The latter allows both a longer statute of limitations, no burden of EEOCcharge filing, and similar awards of attorneys fees and punitive damages. See J. CUNYON GORDON,
CHI. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, TITLE VII AND SECTION 1981, at 45-46,

53-56 (2012).
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B. Judicial "Framework"Reform: Towards a Less-Stacked Deck
Beyond EEOC practices, however, the far larger issue is the judicial
channeling of cases into analytical frameworks that divert the statutory
inquiry of intent into, instead, shifting sands and slippery slopes for
plaintiffs, which can be manipulated by employers to refocus-or
perhaps more accurately-mis-focus the statutory inquiry from proving
intent to the employee having to prove, instead, pretext.,1 6 This exposure
is accentuated by the courts adopting myriad devices to convert issues of
intent on MSJ into issues of law decided by judges rather than fact issues
for juries.157 This article suggests that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
progeny need to be reexamined by refocusing on the intent question as
framed by the statute rather than the version re-cast by the judicial
frameworks and adopting a fairer standard that hews the statute. This
article proposes two options: return to the statute or modify the
framework.
1. Reform Option One: Return to the Statute: Straight-up Jury Question
of Intent
Returning to basics, the intent standard of Title VII for disparate
treatment cases is seemingly straightforward: "[A]n unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
If the plaintiff pleads a plausible
factors also motivated the practice."1
claim, she can advance to discovery.'" 9 Discovery either produces the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive
summary judgment, as determined by the court, or it does not.160 The
issue becomes simply one of applying the statute in light of established
pleading and summary judgment principles. In such an inquiry, the
plaintiff can, but is not required to, adduce evidence that overlaps the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case elements, as well as Burdine-type
evidence of pretext. 6 1 Upon MSJ, the court determines the sufficiency
of a genuine issue of material fact as to the statutory inquiry of whether a

156.

See supranote 98 and accompanying text.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See supranote 98 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (2012).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2012).
See Gordon, supra note 155, at 10-11.
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protected characteristic was a motivating factor for the challenged
decision.16 2 The difference, as here proposed, is that Title VII directly,
rather than pretext problematically, becomes the straightforward
framework for the application of the summary judgment standard.1 6 3
And, to the anticipated contention that this revision is too unfiltered, this
article presents two responses: (i) statutes are customarily applied in
light of their words rather than in light of frameworks adopted as
statutory surrogates; 6 4 and (ii) the statutory word "motivating" is a
filter, requiring plaintiff to prove to the satisfaction of the judge that the
protected characteristic was not merely "a factor" but, indeed, rose to the
status of potentially being "a motivating" one, in order to survive MSJ.
2. Reform Option Two: Reform the Framework to Place the Burden on
the Employer to Prove its Business Reasons In the Face of an
Adequately Mounted Plaintiff s Claim
The rub with the current status of Title VII law is that the case law
formulation of proof detours from the statutory inquiry of intent and
requires the plaintiff to overcome three burdens of proof-each with its
own set of dispositive barriers, plus an array of evidence-neutering
devices.1 6 5 Title VII, however, presents only one: intent to discriminate,
which should be allowed to be established by an inference-that is
potentially dispositivefor plaintiff if not neutralized by the employer. 66
First, the plaintiff now must plead a plausible claim-or risk being
thrown out of court if the judge concludes that the case is not plausible;
previously, mere "notice pleading" was the requirement. 167 The
difference is not insignificant: the change invites a judicial scrutiny of
the adequacy of the pleading at a higher level, not previously required,
thus ratcheting up the standard used to determine if the plaintiff will be
allowed access to discovery. Discovery would give the plaintiff a
chance to solidify the claim and test the evidence in support of the

162.
163.

See Gordon, supra note 155, at 6.
See Gordon, supra note 155, at 6, 10-11.

164. See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 97-589, STATUTORY
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (2008).

INTERPRETATION:

165. See supratext accompanying notes 64-80
166. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 527-28 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("Under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, however, proof of a prima facie case not only raises an
inference of discrimination; in the absence of further evidence, it also creates a mandatory
presumption in favor of the plaintiff.").
167. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957).
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employer's explanation.16 8 Second, the plaintiff must mount a prima
facie case or risk being thrown out of court on MSJ without regard to the
employer's business reason for the challenged action.1 6 9 And third, once
the employer merely articulates (and supplements) any business reason
it chooses to assert for its challenged action, as to which the employer
bears no burden of proof, the plaintiff then acquires yet another the offtarget burden-to prove the falsity or reasons to disbelieve the reasons
asserted by the employer. 170 And, in doing so, the plaintiff also must
overcome case-made inventions which neuter the probity of her factbound evidence of discriminatory intent.
Thus, under existing application of Title VII, the plaintiff must
plead a plausible claim to survive the pleading stage, then prove a prima
facie case to stay alive at the MSJ stage; if the plaintiff passes those
tests, then she must disprove or show to be unbelievable or false the
business reason asserted, selected, crafted, or supplemented by the
Stated still otherwise, assuming the plaintiff pleads a
employer.
plausible claim and mounts a prima facie case, she still must show the
falsity or disbelief of the employer's selected reason in order get to a
jury, while overcoming the land mines of court-made devices which
neuter her evidence serving to keep her from getting to a jury.
The rub is that the statute does not require the employee to show
the falsity or disbelief of the employer's asserted reason to prevail;
rather, it only requires the plaintiff to create a jury-triable question of
intent to discriminate against her due to protected status.17 ' Diverting
the statutory intent inquiry into a case law formulation inquiry of having
to show disbelief or falsity of the employer's reason, deals a triple
whammy: (1) it is not only unfaithful to the intent inquiry mandated by
the statute, but (2) also drives the result of the case to be decided by a
judge rather than a jury, (3) on a different question of existence of an
issue of disbelief or falsity of a business reason that is carefully
formed-or maybe even contrived-by the employer strategically to be

168. See Sullivan, supranote 39, at 1622.
169. See supranotes 66-70 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Indeed, it can take the plaintiff six months
after discharge to be able to learn the employer's reasons for its decision, for which the plaintiff
must then marshal-at potentially considerable expense-discovery to attempt to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to disbelief or falsity (employer lying or covering up) to get to a jury. See
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 543 (Souter, J., dissenting). Ironically, it was the expense of subjecting
defendants to discovery in antitrust cases that propelled adoption of the Twombly-higher standard of
plausibility pleading in place of notice pleading. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
558-59.
171. See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(m) (2012).
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unimpeachable upon the employer's MSJ.17 2
And, all this is
compounded by the evidence-neutering devices discussed above. By
thus allowing the employer to select and control-but not have to
prove-the issue of the reasons for its actions, to which the plaintiff then
must mount a case showing its falsity or belief to get to the jury, the
statutory inquiry of intent is not only diverted elsewhere by the
employer's strategic characterization of its business reason, but is
ignored altogether by becoming a different issue of disbelief of reason
rather than the statutory issue of motivation or intent. 73
The rationale for the employer merely having to articulate, rather
than prove, its business decision, whereas the plaintiff has the burden to
disprove it or show it to be false, is said to be a function of the burdenshifting formulation of the case law which states that the burden of proof
in a Title VII case is always on the plaintiff. 7 4 But, if the plaintiff now
(post-McDonnell Douglas) establishes both a plausible pleading and a
prima facie case, it would not be inconsistent with the plaintiff retaining
a burden of proving intent to discriminate for the court to require the
employer now to prove-rather than to merely articulate-its business
reason. For it is the employer who not only can strategically mold the
reason it offers, but also can control the information, and access thereto,
upon which it may attempt to advantageously position itself to prove the
legitimacy of its decision."7
In the posture proposed here, the plaintiff who meets the higher
standard of pleading a plausible claim and also pleads a prima facie case,
still joins issue with an employer who still has the right to assert
whatever business reason it cares to select for its action.1 76 However,
given that wide berth of the employer, it should now have to carry the
burden of proving to a jury the legitimacy of the reason it chooses to
state for its action. After all, since the mounting of a prima facie case
alone creates sufficient basis for judgment for the employee, even under
existing law, unless the employer carries a burden of articulating a
nondiscriminatory reason of proof as a matter of law, the employee
prevails; the change proposed is to have the employer prove that was the

172. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 539-40 (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding that the majority's
formulation permits, or even compels, an employer to lie about the actual reasons for terminating an
employee).
173. But see id. at 511 (majority opinion) (noting that disbelief of the employer's reason can
become a part of the inquiry of intent).
174. See id. (reiterating "our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears
the 'ultimate burden of persuasion').
175. See Kaminshine, supranote 81, at 9.
176. See discussion supra notes 95-98.
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motivating reason rather than merely to articulate it.'1 7 If the plaintiff
generates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer has
carried its burden of proving-not merely articulating-a
nondiscriminatory reason, then the case goes to the jury for
determination of the ultimate intent question.
If the employer fails to
carry its burden of proving the reason claimed for its decision, summary
judgment may be granted against the employer upon the statutory issue
of intent, rather than on the "framework" issue of whether the plaintiff
has proven pretext (disbelief or falsity of the employer's reasons).1 7 9 Of
course, if the employer has carried its burden of proving the LNBR for
its action, evidence of disbelief or falsity of the employer's business
reason still would be probative, but no longer dispositive, of the baseline
statutory issue of "motivating factor" intent.
Lastly, as to the potential criticism that this proposed revision in
framework would force unfiltered cases to juries, it remains, as noted,
that the judge still determines as a matter of law if there is sufficient
evidence to mount a jury-triable case.' 80 Fundamentally, this revision
would serve the calendar control concerns of the judiciary by making
summary judgment more of a two-way street by potentially positioning
plaintiffs to move for summary judgment by showing that the employee
demonstrated its burden of showing protected status as a motivating
factor, and that under Anderson, the employer failed to carry its burden
to prove an essential element of its case-the burden of proving its
business reason or the reason's legitimacy.
This seems to be the result of (1) the change to a heightened
pleading standard, (2) the law that a prima facie case is alone sufficient
to support judgment for plaintiff, and (3) the ability of the employer to
not only select the reason for its action from the arsenal of facts it
controls, but also (4) to buttress the reason with additional, supplemental
reasons. Does not the plaintiffs prima facie case and the employer's
right to select an articulated reason for its action, along with the
evidence to support it or the supplementation of it, reasonably require
the employer to prove its articulated reason as a straightforward issue
created, as to a genuine issue of material fact? If so, the question of
whether the employer has proven its reason in the face of the plausible

177. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528, 539 (Souter, J., dissenting).
178. See FED. R. Cv. P. 56(a); see also Kaminshine, supra note 81, at 11 & n. 50.
179. See Kaminshine, supra note 81, at 4 ("By knocking out the employer's reason, the
discriminatory explanation emerges as the victor-the real, but-for cause of the employment
action.").
180. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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pleading and prima facie case should be the test for MSJ versus jury
determination.

81

The employer's mere articulation of a reason which it does not have
to prove under current law, not only neutralizes the plaintiffs prima
facie case but also simultaneously forces the plaintiff to prove a genuine
issue of material fact as to falsity or disbelief, thereby summarily
dropping the plaintiff into the summary judgment trick-box of court,
rather than jury, resolution of the statutory intent question; in which
judicial forum, the plaintiffs evidence of discriminatory motivation can
be neutered by the court as a matter of law - hence ripe for dispositive
motion - keeping the case from the jury. This is made all the more
circular by the Supreme Court's characterization of the McDonnell
Douglas formulation as a mere "procedural device" claimed to get the
intent issue expeditiously to the jury. 182 But precisely the reverse
appears to be engineered by the employer's opportunity to cleverly craft
bullet-proof business reasons for its actions which it need only
articulate-not prove-coupled with further having to face the

181. Finally, if the EEOC can effectively rewrite Title VII to self-authorize itself by regulation
to, upon request, dispense with its statutory obligation to investigate, and to attempt conciliation
when it finds cause, see supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text, then arguably, it should easily
require by regulation any employer against whom a charge is filed, to immediately state its specific
reasons for its actions, so the employee does not have to resort to court litigation to flush out those
reasons and discovery as to their credibility to attempt to mount a pretext case.
182. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has posited that when the
prima facie case is rebutted by the articulation of the business reason, the McDonnell Douglas
burdens of allocation of proof drops out of the case, and the ultimate issue then reduces itself to the
straightforward issue of discriminatory intent framed by the statute. Thus, the Court states that
when the prima facie case is met by assertion of a legitimate business reason:
[T]he presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted and "drops from the case."
The plaintiff then has "the full and fair opportunity to demonstrate, through presentation
of his own case and through cross-examination of the defendant's witnesses, "that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision," and that race
was. ...

. .. But whatever doubt Burdine might have created was eliminated by Aikens. There
we said, in language that cannot reasonably be mistaken, that "the ultimate question [is]
discrimination vel non."
Id. at 507-08, 518 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff
had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer
relevant. The district court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide whether "the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."
On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the District Court in this case

should have proceeded to this specific question directly, just as district courts decide
disputed questions of fact in other civil litigation... . In short, the district court must
decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes.
U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983) (citations omitted).
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headwind of the numerous court-created evidence-neutering devices.
This is all grounded in the concept of the statutory requirement that the
plaintiff always has the burden of proving discrimination (and that even
disproving the employer's reasons does not necessarily result in
automatically establishing that discrimination was the real reason,
Reeves, supra).183 But the application of all this cumulative court made
law and interpretations have upended the statute's words and Congress'
goal. The statutory obligation to prove discrimination can also be
reasonably transformed into a "mandatory presumption" resulting from
the plaintiffs mounting a plausible pleading and a prima facie case.184
That "mandatory presumption," coupled with the employer's inability to
prove (rather than merely articulate) legitimacy of its business decision
(rather than the employee also having to prove falsity of the business
reason which may have been strategically selected by the employer for
litigation value from its pool of evidence), should be enough to establish
employer liability.
V. CONCLUSION

The foundations for analyzing Title VII dispositive motions have
become more restrictive, as have the analytical frameworks for
evaluating them, resulting in dispositive motions being used increasingly
to restrictively prune Title VII claims-which turn on sublime issues of
motivation and intent claims-from juries. This has resulted initially
from raising the bar of pleading required to survive a motion to dismiss.
More broadly, however, the courts have replaced the statutory intent
inquiry of the plaintiff in a Title VII disparate treatment case; the court
requires the plaintiff to prove the falsity or disbelief of the employer's
reason for its action-which is a detoured inquiry from the statutory
intent question-while simultaneously allowing the employer to
strategically select that reason (or even contrive it) to position the
discovery record for summary judgment in its favor. This is further

183. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508, 511 ("[Plaintiff| retains that 'ultimate burden of persuading
the [trier of fact] that [he] has been the victim of intentional discrimination."' (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981))).
184. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's
evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must
enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.
Id. Thus, mounting the prima facie case is more that procedural; it is substantive in Title VII cases.
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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aided by the creation of artifices under the cover of the Rule 56
summary judgment rubric which transform evidence of discrimination
from issues of intent for the jury into questions of law for the courtwhich the court may then use to divert the case from the jury (and from
its docket). With the foundations thus changed, the entire foundation for
the use of dispositive motions in Title VII disparate treatment cases
should be reexamined to reassess whether they are serving the core
purpose of achieving faithfulness to the statute. This article has
presented suggestions for achieving that objective in a balanced fashion.
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